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CONTROLLING THE REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS OF IMPOVERISHED WOMEN: IS 
THIS THE WAY TO "REFORM" WELFARE? 
MELYNDA G. BROOMFIELD* 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbe-
cility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vac-
cination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
These are the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes in a 1927 Supreme 
Court decision which upheld Virginia's right to sterilize a woman who 
was "feeble-minded."2 As horrifying as his words seem, the theory that 
certain people in our society are unfit to reproduce has resurfaced and 
is an underlying theme of many recent welfare "reforms."3 The Ameri-
can public is calling for a complete overhaul of the current "welfare" 
system.4 Unfortunately, the brunt of the attack has fallen on the backs 
of impoverished women who are seen as responsible for the problems 
plaguing this system.s Several of the current welfare "reform" proposals 
* Topics Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
2 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207; Alexander Cockburn, Social Cleansing; Eugenics in the U.S., NEW 
STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Aug. 5, 1994, at 16. In fact, the plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was not feeble-
minded at all and the evidence in the case was fabricated. Cockburn, supra at 16. Ms. Buck was 
actually sterilized because she was poor and had gotten pregnant out of wedlock. Dorothy Roberts, 
Norplant's Threat to Civil Liberties and RacialJustice, NJ. LJ.,July 26,1993, at 20. 
3 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 20. 
4 As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it." Joel F. 
Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"-Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 CEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 3 (1994). The word "welfare" itself has begun to take on negative conno-
tations and is portrayed by reformers as hand-outs which are given to unworthy and lazy indi-
viduals. See infra Part II. I would contrast the use of this word with "public assistance," which 
seems to serve as a better reminder of what these programs are all about-assisting members of 
our society in their time of need. 
5 Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The Norplant Debate, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 36. 
Alexander Cockburn writes, "As always, blame the victims-for the profoundest myth of all is that 
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effectively punish poor women and control their rights to procreate, 
either by limiting the benefits for additional children, or by giving cash 
bonuses to women who submit to the implantation of birth control 
devices.6 Such measures have little to do with eliminating poverty, and 
in fact, may push those in need of assistance even further below the 
poverty line.7 
The American people have shown their desire for change by 
electing Bill Clinton to the Presidency in 1992,8 and then even more 
so in 1994, by placing Republicans in control of a Congress which had 
been controlled by Democrats for the last forty years.9 This passion for 
change is further evidenced by the support for the Republican "Con-
tract With America."l0 The "Contract With America" is a group of bills 
that the Republicans promised to bring for a vote before Congress in 
the first one hundred days of the 1995 session. ll One of these bills, the 
Personal Responsibility Act, seeks to reform welfare and to "[d]iscour-
age illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor 
mothers and denying increased AFDC [Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children] for additional children while on welfare, cut spending 
for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision 
with work requirements to promote individual responsibility. "12 The 
current public assistance system does certainly require change, consid-
ering the fact that there are still too many people who currently live 
below the poverty line.13 But what the system needs is meaningful 
which makes poor, young, unmarried mothers responsible for drug abuse, slums, poverty, stag-
nation, the falling rate of profit, [and] America's declining role in the world economy." Cockburn, 
supra note 2, at 16. 
6 See, e.g., 1995 MASS. S.B. 1778 § 8 (f); 1993 KAN. H.B. 2776 § 1 (a); Gloria Negri & Anthony 
Flint, States Take Hard Line on Dependency, Punitive Actions Gaining Favor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 
16, 1994, at 1; William Claiborne, New Jersey Effort to Cut Welfare Gets Support in Federal Lawsuit, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4,1994, at A7; Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36. 
7 See Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based Perspective, 22 FORD. URB. 
LJ. 897, 901 (1995). 
8 Carl M. Cannon, It's Clinton for a Change, Victory Brings New Era, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 
4, 1992, at AI. 
9 "Contract with America" Unfair to Children, CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND REp., Jan., 1995, at 1 
[hereinafter CDF REp.]; see The Contract's Fine Print, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1994, at 90. 
10 The Contract's Fine Print, supra note 9, at 90; see Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Human 
Resources, House Ways and Means Comm., 104th Cong., Jan. 13, 1995 [hereinafter Greenstein 
Testimony] (statement of Robert Greenstein, Executive Director, Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities) . 
11 CDF REp., supra note 9, at 1. 
12 H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Text of Republican Contract With America, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 30, 1994; see, e.g., Jill Zuckman, House Committee Approves Core of GOP's Welfare 
Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8,1995, at 11. 
13 Jonathan Peterson, Number of Poor Americans Declines, U.S. Report Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
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change which will address the causes of poverty and will allow more 
women to live better lives by creating easier access to improved educa-
tion, child care, and health care. 14 
However, most of the change that the American people are seek-
ing is based on faulty information and serious misconceptions as to 
who is actually on public assistance, and what life on public assistance 
is really like. 15 It is in response to the stereotype of the "typical" welfare 
mother who gets pregnant to earn more benefits that legislatures have 
passed bills which attempt to prevent these women from having more 
children. 16 
Some of these current measures, which include the "family cap" 
and Norplant-bonuses, are not only unconscionable, but are also un-
constitutionalP Such legislation violates the fundamental rights of 
women who are on public assistance, without a compelling interest by 
the state which would justify such extreme measures. IS 
Part II of this Note will discuss the current incorrect perception 
of the welfare mother, by explaining the myth and the reality of women 
on public assistance. Part III will examine two currently popular legis-
lative proposals: the "family cap" and Norplant-bonuses. Part IV will 
explore the Supreme Court's legal standards for cases involving public 
assistance, with respect to the rights guaranteed under the United 
States Constitution. Part V will address the unconstitutionality of the 
current "welfare reform" proposals using the Court's analysis, and Part 
VI concludes that these two reforms in particular are unconstitutional. 
II. THE BASIS OF THE WELFARE MYTH 
At the turn of the century, the eugenics movement in the United 
States gained popularity.19 Eugenics is a scientific theory which at-
6, 1995, at 4. Overall, there were 38.1 million Americans who were living in poverty in 1994, and 
although this is a slight decrease from the previous year, the group who continues to suffer the 
highest rates of poverty are children. [d. 
14Jennifer S. Madden, Family Caps Threaten Women and Their Children, 10 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S LJ. 171, 173 (1995); Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources, House Ways 
and Means Comm., 104th Cong., Feb. 2, 1995 [hereinafter Young Testimony] (statement of Cathy 
Young, Vice President of Women's Freedom Network on welfare reform). 
15 Susan Bennett and Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare "Reform, " 
26 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 741, 758 (1993); Marc Stuart Gerber, Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, 
and Learnfare: Wealth Classifications Revisited, 81 GEO. LJ. 2141, 2141 (1993); Greenstein Testi-
mony, supra note 10. 
16 See, e.g., 1995 MASS. S.B. 1778 § 8 (f); 1993 KAN. H.B. 2776 § l(a). 
17 See infra Part VI. 
18 See infra Part IV. 
19 Roberts, supra note 2, at 20. "During the first half of the 20th century, the eugenics 
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tempts to improve the human species by influencing and encouraging 
reproduction by persons presumed to have desirable genetic traits.20 
Supporters of this theory argue for the compulsory sterilization of 
people likely to produce allegedly defective traits.21 Eugenicists believe 
that "the condition of the oppressed was caused by their own incurable, 
inherited deficiencies, and was unrelated to political, economic, or 
social realities."22 In the early 1900's, an estimated 70,000 people were 
involuntarily sterilized under state statutes which were directed at mem-
bers of society deemed to be undesirable: mainly the mentally retarded, 
the mentally ill, epileptics, and criminals.23 
Current welfare reformists are not strict eugenicists in that they 
are not arguing social status is inherited.24 However, one theory behind 
welfare reform is based on the same premise-that certain people in 
our society do not deserve to procreate.25 The public perception of 
people on welfare is often incorrect, and is based on stereotypes which 
are grounded on racism, sexism, and classism.26 
This racist, sexist, and classist viewpoint translates into a stereotype 
of typical welfare recipients: "unmarried, young black women with 
several children, who are long-term dependents of the welfare system 
and whose dependency is in turn passed on from g~neration to gen-
eration. "27 Legislators, as well as the media, point to these women as 
being responsible for our social ills.28 Such blame only serves to further 
movement fostered the theory that intelligence and other personality traits are genetically deter-
mined and therefore inherited. This hereditarian belief, coupled with the reform approach of 
the progressive era, propelled a campaign to remedy America's social problems by stemming 
biological degeneracy." Id. 
20 WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 460 (1992). 
21 Roberts, supra note 2, at 20. 
22Id. ''This social experimentation often imposes the majority's view of 'desirable' behavior 
onto the minority-in this case the poverty-stricken." Gerber, supra note 15, at 2142-43. 
23Id. 
24Id. 
25 Id.; Gwendolyn Mink, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: Welfare RefO'rm in Histori-
cal Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REv. 879, 894 (1994). Cockburn writes that "budgetary concerns about 
the costs of welfure more often than not have a eugenic undertow." Cockburn, supra note 2, at 16. 
26 See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: BehaviO'T Modification Welfare Reform Propos-
als, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 737 (1992) [hereinafter Ideology of Division]; Dethroning the Welfare Qyeen: 
The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L. REv. 2013, 2019 (1994) [hereinafter Welfare Qyeen]; Bennett 
& Sullivan, supra note 15, at 759. 
27Handler, supra note 4, at 7; see Welfare Qyeen, supra note 26, at 2019; see also Lucy A. 
Williams, Race, Rat Bites & Unfit Mothers: How Media DiscO'Urse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 
22 FORDHAM DRB. LJ. 1159, 1163 (1995) [hereinafter Race, Rat Bites]. 
28 See Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36. 
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alienate those on public assistance, a group which already has very little 
power in our society.29 
Many of the welfare reform proposals attack Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), which is the largest need-based cash 
welfare program providing grants to families.30 AFDC provides direct 
cash assistance to "needy children who have been deprived of parental 
support or care because their father or mother is absent from the 
home continuously, is incapacitated, is deceased or is unemployed, and 
certain others in the household of such child. "31 Over two-thirds of 
current recipients of AFDC are children.32 
The definition of what constitutes "need" is determined by each 
state, and must be uniformly applied to similarly situated families.33 To 
determine eligibility for AFDC benefits, the recipient must report all 
income, which is counted against the potential grant of benefits.34 
A. The Demographics of Those On Public Assistance-Myth 
versus Reality 
Because the perception of a typical AFDC recipient is one of a lazy 
teenaged mother sitting around having children and waiting for her 
next check, some reformers believe that preventing recipients from 
having more children will solve the problems of AFDC.35 Reflecting the 
viewpoint that the fertility of poor women should be controlled, one 
Illinois judge stated: "How many children of a parent should the 
29 See id. The Reverend Janet Swift, pastor of the Trinity Mrican Methodist Episcopal Church 
of Utah, characterizes some of the current welfare "reforms" as punishment for those members 
of society unfortunate enough to fall into the category of a "have-not" and she states, "[W] e would 
hope that, as a nation, we would not be so mean-spirited as to be punitive to the most vulnerable 
people in our society. This is inhumane and inhuman. It's hostile, hateful, unkind, unloving and 
un-Christian." Nancy Hobbs, Family Cap Proposal Has Many Critics; No Aid for Welfare Babies? 
ACLU Vows to Sue Over Legislators' 'Family Cap' Bill, SALT LAKE T'RIB., Dec. 13, 1994, at Cl. 
30 Gerber, supra note 15, at 2141; Nancy Hobbs, Putting Welfare in Working Order, Advocates 
Fear It's open Season on Less Fortunate; The Needy at the Center of Attention, SALT LAKE T'RIB., Jan. 
29, 1995, at Bl. 
31 Welfare QJ.teen, supra note 26, at 2018. The framework for AFDC is established in the Social 
Security Act and through regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
32 Bruce Nicholson, Urgent Action Requested: Welfare Reform Bill Slated to House Floor, A.B.A., 
Mar. 9, 1995 at 2. 
33 Welfare QJ.teen, supra note 26, at 2019 n.27. 
34Id. at 2019. 
35 See Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 15, at 756; see also Testimony Before the Committee on 
Economic and Educational opportunities, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Cong.,Jan. 18, 1995 
[hereinafter Rector Testimony] (statement of Robert Rector, Policy Analyst, the Heritage Foun-
dation). 
222 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2 
taxpayers of this state have to support in foster homes or alternate care 
before the state has the right to say, '[y] ou can't have any more 
children until you take care of the ones you already have?"'36 Unfortu-
nately, because these perceptions are not supported by fact, proposals 
to prevent further births will not achieve their desired effect; "[t]he 
underlying assumptions ... that AFDC mothers have many children, 
that they have free access to medical options for family planning, and 
that they get pregnant in order to receive additional benefits-are 
unsound."37 Consequently, these reforms are unduly harsh and will not 
alleviate poverty, which should be the ultimate goal of overhauling the 
system.38 
There are many erroneous and inaccurate perceptions of public 
assistance recipients.39 The belief that all AFDC recipients are Mrican 
American is a misconception.4o There are actually more white people 
receiving assistance than Mrican Americans; in fact, Mrican Americans 
constitute only 37% of those receiving public assistance.4l White fami-
lies account for approximately 39%, and the remainder consists of 
Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans.42 
The perceived size of families on public assistance is also inaccu-
rate: "[A]n underlying assumption of child exclusion principles is that 
families on welfare are larger than families in general. "43 In fact, the 
average AFDC family is approximately the same size as a non-AFDC 
family.44 As of 1992, 72.5% of all AFDC families had one or two chil-
dren, and 89.9% of families on AFDC had no more than three chil-
dren.45 In fact, over the past few decades, the size of AFDC families has 
been decreasing; in 1969, 32.5% of AFDC families had four or more 
36 Lynn Smith and Nina J. Easton, The Dilemma of Desire, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, (Maga-
zine) , at 24. 
37ldeolog;y of Division, supra note 26, at 737. 
38 Handler, supra note 4, at 8. ''While the welfare system has several problems, the problem 
that we should focus on is poverty, which is much broader and more serious than welfare alone 
is." ld. 
391d. at 7. 
40 Madden, supra note 14, at 17l. 
41 Race, Rat Bites, supra note 27, at 1190. 
421d. 
43 Nicholson, supra note 32. 
44 ldeolog;y of Division, supra note 26, at 737; Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2020. But see 
Christina Del Valle & Mike McNamee, Welfare Surprises, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 44. 
(stating that AFDC recipients on average have 2.6 children, while non-welfare mothers average 
2 .1 children). 
45 Nicholson, supra note 32. Nineteen-ninety-two is the most recent year for which complete 
statistics are available. ld. 
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children, whereas that figure dropped to 9.9% by 1990.46 If AFDC 
benefits induce women to have more children, arguably, the studies 
should reveal a more direct correlation between average family size 
and benefit valueY However, the data does not support that such a 
correlation exists since these figures are no larger than those found 
among two-parent families in the general population.48 
Furthermore, the perception that most recipients are on welfare 
for long periods of time is misleading; two-thirds of AFDC recipients 
receive benefits for less than two years, and of those recipients who 
received benefits for more than two years, many are not continuous 
users.49 Approximately 70% of women who join the welfare rolls are 
off public assistance within two years.50 However, the long term users 
do accumulate, and at any given point in time, they will represent a 
substantial portion of the welfare population. 51 This is true even though 
the percentage of those continuously on welfare is less than 15%.52 
Additionally, 64% of young women who grew up in families receiving 
welfare did not go on to receive assistance as they reached adulthood.53 
Furthermore, a very low percentage of those receiving public 
assistance are teenagers; only 7.6% of families receiving AFDC were 
headed by teens.54 And the large majority of those are either eighteen 
or nineteen; only 1.2% of mothers receiving AFDC are less than eight-
een years old. 55 
46 Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 738. 
47 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2020. 
48 Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 737-38. 
49 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2022. 
50Jesse Malkin, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Dec. 6, 1993, at 1 (National Issue Section). 
51 Handler, supra note 4, at 14. The House Ways and Means Committee explains this point 
with the following example: "Consider a 13-bed hospital in which 12 beds are occupied for an 
entire year by 12 chronically ill patients, while the other bed is used by 52 patients, each of whom 
stays exactly 1 week. On any given day, a hospital census would find that about 85% of the patients 
(12/13) were in the midst oflong spells of hospitalization. Nevertheless, viewed over the course 
of a year, short-term use clearly dominates: out of 64 patient~ using hospital services, about 80% 
(52/64) spent only 1 week in the hospital." Id. 
52 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2022. "Continuously on welfare" refers to those receiving 
public assistance for periods of two years or longer. Id. 
53 Race, Rat Bites, supra note 27, at 1190 n.159 (citing Greg Duncan & Martha Hill, Welfare 
Dependence Within and Across Generations, SCIENCE, Jan. 1988 at 467, 469). 
54Id. at 1190 n.160 (citing 1994 GreenBook at 401). 
55Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPEND-
ENT CHILDREN: CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS 42 
(1992)). In the summer of 1993, only 32,000 of the 3.8 million mothers receiving AFDC were 
under 18 and unmarried, and the average age of recipients is 30. Del Valle & McNamee, supra 
note 44, at 44. 
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Despite these figures, many people "believe that welfare itself is 
the problem at the root of entrenched 'intergenerational' poverty .... 
[W] elfare policy ... causes families, especially those headed by women, 
to be and to remain poor. "56 People believe this because of the images 
repeated again and again by the media of what is perceived to be a 
"typical" woman on public assistance.57 Consequently, more realistic 
views of women on AFDC who are living difficult lives, struggling 
through school, who are not drug-addicted or child-abusers, and who 
are simply trying to raise their families, are ignored in both news 
reports and legislative debates.58 As a result, these debates and resulting 
legislation are driven by the exception, and in practice will not have 
any positive effect on reforming the lives of most AFDC recipients. 59 
Advocates of welfare "reform" believe that the welfare system itself 
is responsible for encouraging self-destructive behavior because it "in-
sidiously, creates its own clientele; by undermining work ethic and 
family structure, the welfare state generates a growing population in 
'need of aid.' Welfare bribes individuals into courses of behavior which 
in the long run are self-defeating to the individual, harmful to chil-
dren, and increasingly, a threat to society. "60 However, even the assump-
tion that welfare itself is the cause of the problem is not based in fact. 
Although the real value of welfare benefits has actually fallen more 
than 45% since 1970, the percentage of illegitimate births has risen 
dramatically during that time.61 Again, this correlation simply does not 
support the theory that welfare itself is responsible for the behavior. 
But for the many people who hold this belief, the only way to break 
this cycle of poverty is to prevent future births, even at the cost of 
punishments and penalties on impoverished women, whose only crime 
is their poverty. 
B. The Fiscal Side of Public Assistance-Myth versus Reality 
One misconception is that AFDC constitutes a large portion of 
government spending.62 In reality, AFDC spending is much less expen-
sive than other federal benefit programs.63 In fact, in 1993, the total 
56 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2023. 
57 !Wee, !Wt Bites, supra note 27, at 1163. 
58Id. at 119I. 
59Id. 
60 Rector Testimony, supra note 35. 
61 Hobbs, Putting Welfare in Working Order, supra note 30, at BI. 
62 Handler, supra note 4, at 12. 
63Id. 
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AFDC assistance payment was $22.3 billion, with $12.2 paid by the 
federal government.64 In contrast, the Food Stamps programs cost $23 
billion in federal funds, Medicaid cost $132 billion, Medicare approxi-
mately $143 billion, and Social Security Retirement and Disability cost 
$419 billion.65 Because of concerns for the increasing federal deficit, 
taxpayers are urging legislators to balance budgets and trim govern-
ment spending.66 Although the average state spends only 3.4% of its 
budget on welfare,67 and at the federal level, AFDC (including cash 
benefits, emergency assistance, child support enforcement, Title IV-A 
child care, and "at-risk" child care) constitutes only 2% of entitlement 
spending and 1 % of total federal spending, the public perception is 
that these programs are responsible for the huge debt.68 This percep-
tion, coupled with the public distaste for those on welfare, has resulted 
in a situation where "some states have found it politically easier to deal 
with their fiscal pressures by cutting welfare benefits rather than serv-
ices used by the middle-class. "69 
The small increase in benefits from each additional child does not 
appear to provide a strong incentive for AFDC recipients to have 
children.70 A Georgia welfare director remarked, "[A]nyone who thinks 
that a woman goes through nine months of pregnancy, the pain of 
childbirth, and 18 years of rearing a child for $45 more a month ... 
has got to be a man. "71 
The lack of a correlation between having more children and 
obtaining more benefits is evident from a comparison of benefit levels 
from state to state.72 Maine and Vermont are the two states with the 
lowest percentage of families with four or more children, and both 
have AFDC grant levels which rise above the national median. 73 On the 
other hand, Mississippi has the lowest AFDC grant level of any state in 
64 Id. at 13. 
65 Id. Of families receiving public assistance (federal, state, and local) in 1993 only 24% 
received means-tested aid (such as AFDC) in contrast to the 38% who received Social Security, 
Medicare, unemployment, veterans', and other non-means tested government benefits. James A. 
Krauskopf, The Administration of Public Assistance, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 883,892 (1995). 
66 See Gerber, supra note 15, at 2141. 
67 Id. at 2173 n.6. 
68 Greenstein Testimony, supra note 10. 'The perception that welfare costs are spiraling out 
of control lies close to the heart of reform proposals." Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 15, at 753. 
69 Gerber, supra note 15, at 2141. 
70 See Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 737-39. 
71 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2026 n.81 (citing Ann Plant, Director of Clayton County 
Dep't of Family and Childrens Services). 
72 See Ideology of Division, supra note 23, at 740 n.132. 
73 Id. 
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the nation, and at the same time has the highest percentage of families 
with four or more children.74 Ironically, Georgia, the home state of the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, has one of 
the highest rates of unwed teen mothers while giving some of the 
lowest benefits in the country.75 Writers Christina Del Valle and Mike 
McNamee point out, "Money apparently isn't the lure Newt thinks it is."76 
The small increase in benefits for additional children does not 
even cover the basic essential costs of raising a child, including such 
expenses as diapers, clothing, and formula. 77 Currently, no state pro-
vides enough assistance that would even bring a mother of two to the 
poverty line, and experts believe that the children in these families are 
getting less than half of the funds necessary for them to be safe and 
healthy.78 Robert Greenstein, the Executive Director of the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, states, "While some believe the AFDC 
system provides overly generous benefits to recipients, the typical AFDC 
family of three receives between $8,000 and $9,000 annually in cash 
and nutrition aid, or less than three-quarters of the poverty line. "79 
By denying a mother the right to have future children, or by 
reducing the benefits for any additional children that she does have, 
the state has imposed a major burden on both the mother and her 
children.80 The attempt seems to be to force the mother to feel the 
burden of her poverty and to behave more responsibly.8! Reformers 
argue that for the rest of the working population, a raise is not given 
by a boss with each additional child, so why should it be any different 
for a family receiving public assistance?82 This argument, however, can 
be countered by the fact that when another child is born into a working 
family, the benefit received through federal tax deductions is actually 
74Id. 
75 Del Valle & McNamee, supra note 44, at 44. 
76Id. 
77 Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 740. Likewise, Bruce Nicholson of the American Bar 
Association notes that "the increment of money added currently for a child born to a family on 
federal assistance is too small . . . compared to additional expenses incurred to reasonably 
maintain that this amount motivates conception." Nicholson, supra note 32, at 5. 
78 Marion Buckley, Eliminating the Per-Child Allotment in the AFDC Program, 13 LAW & 
INEQUALITY 169, 180 (1994). 
79 Greenstein Testimony, supra note 10. 
80 Indira Lakshmanan, Proposed Cuts Hurt Children, Groups Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1995, 
at 31; CDF REp., supra note 9, at l. 
81 Welfare Queen, supra note 26, at 2026. 
82Id. 
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higher than the small increase received by AFDC families in most states 
for each additional child.83 
The proliferation of this stereotype of a typical welfare mother 
shifts the focus of meaningful welfare reform away from the eradica-
tion of poverty, and instead centers on punishing poor people for what 
is perceived as irresponsible behavior. 84 
III. Two CURRENT WELFARE "REFORMS" 
Two welfare "reforms" which seem to be gaining popularity are 
the "family cap"85 and Norplant-bonuses.86 Both of these "reforms" 
involve a woman's decision to bear another child, which is one of the 
most intimate decisions a woman can make.87 These "reforms" attempt 
to impose restrictions on the number of children that a woman on 
public assistance can bear.88 
A. The Family Cap 
The "family cap" refers to a program whereby a mother already 
receiving AFDC would be prevented from getting an increase in the 
standard monthly cash grant if she gives birth to another baby.89 This 
type of program is also often referred to as "child exclusion," "new 
baby penalty," or a "family development plan.,ogoWhatever this "reform" 
is called, its effect is the same: to prevent additional children from 
resulting in additional benefits to families on welfare.91 
New Jersey was the first state in the nation to enact a family cap; 
and Arkansas, Indiana, and Wisconsin have also recently received fed-
83 Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 739 n.128; Welfare QJi,een, supra note 26, at 2026--27. 
"For example, a married couple with one child and income up to $48,700 in 1992 receives a 
federal tax savings of $345 per year for an additional child; a married couple with one child and 
income between $48,700 and $99,450 receives a federal tax savings of $645 a year for an additional 
child. Ideology of Division, supra note 26, at 739 n.128. 
84 See generally Laura M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: 
Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 637, 658-60 (1995). 
85 Carl Horowitz, Who's Entitled to Entitlement?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 8, 1995, at AI. 
86 Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
87 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453 (1972). 
88 See infra notes 86--95, 128-35 and accompanying text. 
89 Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 15, at 754; Claiborne, supra note 6, at A7; Tom Weidlich, 
Class Actions Target Cuts in Welfare Aid to Mothers, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 16, 1995, at A12. 
90 Hobbs, Family Cap Proposal Has Many Critics, supra note 29, at Cl; Cockburn, supra note 
2, at 16. 
91 Cockburn, supra note 2, at 16 (referring specifically to New Jersey's family cap). 
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eral permission to institute a cap.92 Overall, ten states have approved 
family caps in 1995, and some, including Massachusetts, are still await-
ing federal approvaP3 Five states have caps that are enforced.94 The 
Massachusetts legislation provides in relevant part: "[T]he department 
shall not provide any increased assistance or incremental wage pay-
ment ... because of the addition to a family or any child born after 
the 'child of record.'''95 In December of 1995, House Republicans 
passed compromise welfare legislation by a vote of 245 to 178.96 The 
legislation includes regulations which prohibit states from using fed-
eral funds to increase cash benefits to families who have children while 
on welfare; however, states may pass laws to exempt themselves from 
this "family cap."97 President Clinton is expected to veto this legislation, 
and the 67-vote margin is not enough to override the President's veto.98 
1. Proponents of a "Family Cap" 
Supporters of a benefits cap feel that the current system of grant-
ing additional benefits with the birth of additional children bribes 
impoverished women to behave irresponsibly.99 Supporters believe that 
reforms are needed to discourage this irresponsible behavior and can 
find "no reason to provide expanded welfare benefits to single mothers 
92 Horowitz, supra note 85, at AI. 
93 Changing Welfare; The Status of Welfare: While Congress Bickers over a Bill to Change the 
System, Most States Have Already Done It, STAR ThIB., Jan. 4, 1996, at lOA [hereinafter Congress 
Bickers]; Bob Hohler, Weld, Among Others, to Exult on Welfare, BOSTON GWBE, Mar. 7, 1995, at 10. 
94 Congress Bickers, supra note 93, at IDA. 
95 1995 MASS. S.B. 1778 § 8(f). Section 8(a) defines child of record as "the youngest child of 
a parent receiving assistance on July 1, 1995 or at the time a family first applies for assistance 
after July 1, 1995; provided however, that a child born to a woman who was pregnant on July 1, 
1995 or at the time of first applying for assistance shall be the child of record; provided further 
that the Commissioner shall establish exemptions to allow a latter born child to be the child of 
record if such child was born as a result of rape, incest, or other extraordinary circumstances as 
determined by the Commissioner. The designation of child of record shall not change, even if 
the child no longer lives in the household, or subsequent children are born to the parent, or 
benefits are terminated and the parent subsequently reapplies for assistance." 1995 MASS. S.B. 
1778 § 8(a). 
96 Cheryl Wetzstein, House OKs Welfare Compromise; Margin Too Thin to be Veto-Proof, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at A14. 
97Id. 
98Id. President Clinton has promised to veto the compromise as a "cover to advance a budget 
plan and not real welfare reform." Vanessa Gallman, Veto of Welfare Bill Sure, Clinton Says, THE 
NEWS TruB., Dec. 22, 1995 at A7. 
99 Rector Testimony, supra note 35. 
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who have additional illegitimate children after they are already de-
pendent on welfare."Ioo 
Reformers believe that if AFDC benefits are limited, then there 
will be fewer illegitimate births among women on welfare. lOI Studies to 
determine whether this correlation does exist have been conducted, 
and proponents of the cap allege that the results indicate that this 
premise is true. 102 Research conducted by Dr. June O'Neill found that 
a 50% increase in the monthly value of AFDC and other benefits led 
to a 43% increase in the number of out-of-wedlock births.103 
In a study that was conducted in New Jersey after the passage of 
their "family cap," mothers in a control group received benefits without 
any cap for each additional child, and mothers in an experimental 
group were subject to the cap and did not receive additional AFDC 
payments when they gave birth to additional children. I04 This study 
found that the family cap policy had a substantial effect in reducing 
out-of-wedlock births among welfare recipients in that it resulted in a 
29% decrease in future illegitimate births among women enrolled in 
AFDC.105 
Additionally, New jersey's then Governor,Jim Florio, boasted that 
the family cap had resulted in a 16% drop in births to women on AFDC 
in the first 100 days that the program was instituted.106 The state has 
since revised this claim to a drop of 9%.107 
2. Critics of the "Family Cap" 
Opponents of the family cap have interpreted these same studies 
very differently, and point to other findings that indicate that the cap 
actually has no effect on the birth rate. lOS Researchers have found no 
statistical difference in birth rates among women subject to the cap 
and those in a control group; there was a 6.9% birth rate for women 
whose benefits were capped and a 6.7% rate for those in the control 
100 Id. 
101 Robert Rector, New Jersey Experiment Sharply Cuts Illegitimate Births Among Welfare Mothers, 
HERITAGE FOUND. REp., Feb. 9, 1995, at 50. 
102Id. 
103 Rector Testimony, supra note 35. 
I04Rector, supra note 101, at 50. 
105Id. 
I06Cockburn, supra note 2, at 16. 
107Id. 
108 Id.; Negri & Flint, supra note 6, at 1. 
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group.109 In response to the claims that the cap in New Jersey had in 
fact resulted in fewer births, critics have responded that "simply look-
ing at the difference in the number of births over time and attributing 
the apparent decline to any given factor is without merit and is univer-
sally rejected by serious researchers. "110 These numbers have also been 
criticized on the grounds that the overall birth rate in New Jersey has 
dropped, and that since the measure became law, many mothers do 
not report births anymore. lll Additionally, even if any decline in births 
is a consequence of the family cap, this decline only represents one-
fourth of 1 % of New Jersey's caseload.ll2 
Furthermore, critics contend that in order for New Jersey to achieve 
this claim of a monthly reduction of 94 births, 458 new-born babies 
had to be cut off from the additional cash benefits.ll3 Michael Laracy, 
author of a study called The Jury is Still Out, states that "on this 
perverted logic, five children starve so that one might not be born. 
And for those kids whose mothers are denied the cash increment, 
there lies, down the line, increased chances of child abuse, neglect and 
related suffering. "114 
In effect, increasing the burden of poverty on families will cost the 
country even more, both fiscally and socially.ll5 The social costs are 
severe; for example, "brain dysfunction in poor children ... interferes 
with language and cognitive development, resulting in learning and 
social problems for these children at school. "116 Another strong predic-
tor of adolescent problems (including violent behavior), is early school 
failure. ll7 Furthermore, "education is a crucial determinate of future 
employment, and low income, regardless of race, is the strongest pre-
dictor of school dropout."118 A study by the Urban Institute in Wash-
ington, D.C., has found that the GOP plan would increase the number 
109 Margaret Edds, Analysis Doubts New Jersey Efforts to Reduce Babies on Welfare, THE VIRGIN-
IAN PILOT,July 18, 1995, at B3. 
lIoCockburn, supra note 2, at 16. 
III Negri & Flint, supra note 6, at 1; Judy Nichols, Arizona's Unwed Mothers Will Have to Go 
It Alone; A Slippery Slope: Teen Moms to Lose Benefits, Legislators Target Cycle on Welfare, THE ARIZ. 
REpUBLIC, Oct. 29, 1995, at AI. 
112 Friedman, supra note 84, at 657 n.l09. 
1I3Cockburn, supra note 2, at 16. 
114Id. 
115 See Buckley, supra note 78, at 200-01. 
116 Handler, supra note 4, at 9. 
117 Id. 
118Id. 
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of Americans living in poverty by l.2 million. ll9 Can we as a society 
really "afford" these cuts in public assistance? By ignoring the long-term 
effects of these cuts, any short-term savings seem questionable at best. 120 
Additionally, critics of the "family cap" cite studies which refute 
the supporters' position. For example, a 1992 study in Washington 
state, found that there was no difference in birthrates between women 
on welfare and women who were not receiving any public assistance. 121 
In fact, this study found that the more children a woman has, the 
poorer she gets. 122 This finding shows that women are not getting 
pregnant and having children for more money.123 
Similarly, a national study concluded that welfare benefits only 
slightly influenced a woman's decision to have her first child, and had 
no impact on her decision whether to have more children.124 Women 
on AFDC have children not for the money, but for some of the same 
reasons that all women do-for the babies they want to love, take care 
of, and be loved by.125 This study also confirms that punitive measures 
aimed at behavior modification seem to be ineffective. 126 Jodie Levin-
Epstein of the Center for Law and Social Policy, agrees with this 
finding, stating, "It's illogical to think a woman's sexual behavior is 
motivated by the promise of welfare, which is typically seven dollars a 
day-including food stamps-per person in a family of three. "127 
Lastly, some family caps simply ignore social reality. Most obvi-
ously, they ignore the large role that men play in procreation.128 But 
119 Welfare "Reform "; Clinton Should Veto Republican Plan, STAR TRIB., Dec. 30, 1995, at 16A. 
The Urban Institute is a Washington, D.C., think tank that specializes in anti-poverty policy. [d. 
The author correctly points out that "welfare reform can have many legitimate goals, but making 
more people poor isn't one of them." [d. 
120 Buckley, supra note 78, at 198 ("Any savings in the state AFDC budget likely will be offset 
by increased expenditures in other areas, such as child welfare, foster care, and health care if, as 
some suggest, the legislation gives rise to increased instances of child neglect, increases in the 
number of children entering foster care, and increased numbers of abortions.") 
121 Negri & Flint, supra note 6, at 1. 
122 [d. 
123 See id. 
124 [d. 
125 See Richard DeUriarte, Good Politics Make Poor Policy, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 2, 1995, at 15; 
Buckley, supra note 78, at 183. 
126 Negri & Flint, supra note 6, at 1. 
127 Welfare Reform: What Will Work?, GLAMOUR, Mar. 1995, at 160. Because Glamour is a 
magazine whose target audience is women of child-bearing age and has a very high readership 
among this age group, it is significant that this forum was chosen to debate welfare reform 
proposals. 
128 DeUriarte, supra note 125, at 15. 
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also, the caps may encourage or even induce some women to have 
abortions, which is a problematic position for the state to be advocat-
ing.129 Additionally, family caps ignore the reality that many pregnan-
cies are unplanned, in that even some of the most effective forms of 
birth control fail approximately 5-20% of the time.130 The cap also 
ignores the situation of multiple births, like twins or triplets, which are 
unforeseeable and out of a woman's control. l3l 
B. Norplant-bonuses 
Another controversial welfare "reform" which attempts to affect 
the reproduction of women receiving public assistance is the Norplant-
bonus. 132 Norplant is a new method of birth control consisting of six 
matchstick-size capsules which are surgically implanted in the arm.133 
These capsules slowly release a low dosage of levonorgestrel, one of 
the synthetic forms of the natural hormone progesterone, which has 
the effect of preventing pregnancy.134 Norplant works on a time-release 
basis and is effective for up to five years. 135 
Since Norplant's approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
in 1990, several states have proposed and passed legislation which 
would seek to entice or require women receiving welfare benefits to 
be implanted with Norplant through monetary incentives. 136 All fifty 
states currently cover all or part of Norplant-related costs as a part of 
their Medicaid programs, and all offer reimbursement for the cost of 
implanting Norplant into poor women.137 At least thirteen states have 
considered measures encouraging or requiring poor women to receive 
129James M. Sullivan, The NewJersey Child Exclusion: Model or Mess?, 2 GEO.]. ON FIGHTING 
POVERTY 127, 136, 138 (1994); Tracy Thompson, The Debates Over Welfare; Childbearing Rises Up 
as Dividing Issue, WASH. POST, June 4, 1995, at AI. 
130 Sullivan, supra note 129, at 143. Over one·half of all pregnancies in the United States each 
year are unintended, and a failure of contraception is the reason for 43% of those unintended 
pregnancies. Friedman, supra note 84, at 659 n.126. 
131 Sullivan, supra note 129, at 143. 
132 See generally Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36; Roberts, supra note 2, at 20; John 
Robert Hand, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers Who 
Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. REv. 715, 716 (1993). 
133 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36; Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
134Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36; Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
135 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36; Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
136Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36; David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REv. 189, 190 (1992). 
137 Darci Elaine Burrell, The Norplant Solution: Norplant and the Control of African-American 
Motherhood, 5 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ. 401, 431 (1995). 
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the implant.13s An example of such a measure was the one passed by 
the Kansas legislature which states in relevant part: 
The secretary of social and rehabilitation services shall estab-
lish a program to make available the Norplant contraceptive 
implant ... to each public assistance recipient who is a woman 
who is able to become pregnant and who is receiving Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children. Each such public assis-
tance recipient ... shall be eligible to receive under this 
program a special financial assistance grant in the amount of 
$250 and a special annual financial assistance grant in the 
amount of $50 during the period that the contraceptive re-
mains implanted and continues to be effective in preventing 
pregnancy. 139 
1. Proponents of Norplant-bonuses 
Supporters of Norplant-bonuses feel that in order to encourage 
welfare recipients to break the cycle of welfare dependency, they must be 
persuaded to change their behavior.140 David Duke, a former Ku Klux 
Klan Grand Wizard, recently proposed a Norplant bonus in Louisi-
ana.141 Duke believes that our social problems can be corrected by 
preventing future "undesirable" births, a belief that reflects his eugenicist 
beliefs. 142 
Certainly, not all supporters of Norplant-bonuses are eugenicists 
like David Duke, rather their support is based on the stereotype that 
people choose to be on welfare and need an incentive like money to 
act responsibly.143 For example, Walter Graham, a Mississippi State 
Senator, commented that, "there's a point where if people want to 
continue to receive assistance, they will have to have an implant. ... 
[E]veryone supports the idea of helping the person who cannot. They 
just don't support the concept of helping the person who will not."144 
138 Mink, supra note 25, at 894. 
139 1993 KAN. H.B. 2776 § 1 (al. The Kansas statute further provides for "examinations by 
health care providers to provide for the health and safety of public assistance recipients who are 
to have the contraceptive implanted under the program." Id. 
140 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 36. 
141 Burrell, supra note 137, at 432. 
142 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 5, at 432. 
143Id. at 36. 
144Id. 
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2. Critics of Norplant-bonuses 
Critics of Norplant-bonus statutes feel that this type of legislation 
impermissibly infringes on a woman's right to decide whether or not 
to conceive a child. 145 Generally, these statutes do not only cover the 
cost of the implantation of Norplant, but offer the woman a cash 
"bonus" of up to $500 for agreeing to this surgery.146 Such an amount 
of money to a woman on public assistance may be great enough to 
coerce her into using a birth control method which she cannot con-
trol.147 Dr. Sheldon Segal, the developer of the Norplant contraceptive 
device, is very concerned about the use of the device as a legislative 
control, and points out that "the line between incentive and coercion 
gets very fuzzy" because the temptation to give up her fertility for cash 
may prove to be too much for a woman desperate to pay her bills. 148 
In fact, if the majority of the women receiving public assistance choose 
the $500, then those who do not are in effect penalized $500.149 
Possible side effects of Norplant pose additional concerns that 
must be considered before encouraging women to be implanted with 
the device. 150 The most frequently reported side effects are: altered 
menstrual bleeding patterns (either prolonged bleeding in the first 
several months after the implant, spotting between periods, or no 
periods at all), headaches, acne, weight gain, or depression. 151 Further-
more, the woman must depend on someone else to insert the device, 
and then also to remove it.152 Consequently, the cash incentive may 
involve a dangerous form of coercion: "A $500 check could be big 
145 See, e.g., Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?" 16 
HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 139, 178-80 (1993). 
146 See Hand, supra note 132, at 716. 
147 Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
148 Burrell, supra note 137, at 432. 
149 Hand, supra note 132, at 720. 
150 Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. 
151 Id. Currently, several thousand women have filed lawsuits against Wyeth-Ayerst, the makers 
of Norplant. The majority of the lawsuits concentrate on the removal difficulties, the side effects 
not properly warned about, and an accusation that Wyeth-Ayerst withheld information that the 
capsules are made of silastic, a type of silicone, which has caused immune system problems in 
some women. Jamie Talan, Medical Report: The Norplant Controversy, GLAMOUR, Apr., 1995, at 
66-69. See Welfare Reform supra note 127, at 160. 
152 Smith & Easton, supra note 36, at 24. The surgical removal of the implant by a doctor 
can also cause problems-in some women: the surgery to remove the device has taken hours, 
others have been forced to undergo multiple procedures to remove all of the capsules, others 
have been left with noticeable scars, and in some cases the capsules were hard for a doctor to 
even locate without the use of a sonogram or X-ray. Talan, supra note 151, at 68. 
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enough to tip a poor woman's decision toward Norplant even ifit's not 
safe for her. "153 
Many of the arguments against Norplant-bonuses are the same as 
those against a family cap-the bonuses allow legislatures to make 
moral judgments about poor women's sexual behavior, and assume 
that a monetary incentive is all that is necessary to prevent future 
welfare dependents. 154 Ironically, Dr. Segal, the developer of the device, 
said, "The team that worked on Norplant had been concerned that a 
government would misuse the device to enforce birth control. But they 
were worrying about China, not California. "155 
In addition to the moral and political arguments regarding Nor-
plant-bonuses and family cap welfare "reform" proposals, there are 
constitutional arguments on both sides of the debate. 156 Through an 
examination of the Supreme Court's unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine and its protection of fundamental rights, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it can be argued that these proposals are in violation of 
the U.S. Constitution.157 
IV. THE COURT'S LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE CASES 
A. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine put simply, states that 
the government cannot bribe people with benefits and privileges to 
forego rights with which the government could not interfere directly.15s 
This doctrine prevents the government from regulating the conduct 
of its citizens through the allocation of benefits. 159 The crux of this 
analysis is that if the state cannot directly in terfere with any recognized 
fundamental right, then it cannot do so indirectly, and doing so is a 
violation of the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 16o 
153 Don't Use Norplant Against Welfare Mothers, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1993, at lOA. 
154 See generally Cockburn, supra note 2, at 16. 
155 Burrell, supra note 137, at 402. 
156 See infra Part V. 
157 See infra Part V. 
158Friedman, supra note 84, at 643; Hand, supra note 132, at 716. 
159 Charles R. Bogle, Unconscionable Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public 
Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 193 (1994). 
160 See Hand, supra note 132, at 723. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
states in relevant part: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due Process of law." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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The Due Process Clause includes a substantive component which 
"forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty in-
terests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringe-
ment is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. "161 If the 
right involved is not fundamental, the regulation will only be held to 
the rational basis standard, which is fairly deferential and merely pro-
tects against arbitrary or capricious governmental acts.162 
The Court has been somewhat inconsistent in its analysis of un-
constitutional conditions cases, and the standards that the Court uses 
in evaluating restrictive conditions are not necessarily applied uni-
formly across cases involving different types of assistance. 163 This incon-
sistency makes it difficult to make predictions with a high level of 
certainty.164 Nevertheless, it can be generally asserted that in the cases 
involving public assistance, the Court has held "conditions that act 
either as a penalty on or are likely to deter the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right are invalid under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
unless supported by a compelling state interest."165 The difficulty lies 
in establishing what constitutes a penalty on the exercise of a funda-
mental right. 
The Court has applied various rationales to reach this determina-
tion. 166 Merely losing funds associated with the exercise of a right does 
not always constitute a penalty on that right, in that "a refusal to fund 
protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposi-
tion of a 'penalty' on that activity."167 This was the reasoning in the 
abortion-funding cases, Harris v. McRae and Maher v. Roe, where the 
Court allowed the states to refuse to fund abortions, even though the 
right to an abortion was a constitutionally protected right. 168 In other 
cases, the court has found that a governmentally-enforced choice con-
cerning a fundamental right was an unconstitutional penalty,169 as is a 
governmental deterrence of a fundamental right. l7O 
161 Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993). 
162 Hand, supra note 132, at 750. 
163Friedman, supra note 84, at 645 n.45; Bogle, supra note 159, at 195; Hand, supra note 
132, at 724; Cass R. Susstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 337 (1989). 
164 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 645; see also Bogle, supra note 159, at 200. 
165Bogle, supra note 159, at 208. 
166 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 651. 
167 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 
(1977). 
168 Hams, 448 U.S. at 317; Maher, 432 U.S. at 464. 
169 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
170 See United States v. 'Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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Thus, the relevant analysis with respect to the family cap or Nor-
plant-bonuses seems to fall on whether this type of legislation imper-
missibly penalizes a fundamental right. The right to parent and to 
procreate gained fundamental rights status not through express provi-
sions in the Constitution, but through a long line of Supreme Court 
case law. 171 
1. The Fundamental Right to Parent 
One of the first cases to recognize the fundamental right to parent 
was Meyer v. Nebraska. 172 This case held that the liberties guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment include not only freedom from bodily 
restraint, but also the right of the individual to marry, establish a home, 
and bring up children.173 In Walter M. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, the 
Court held that parents have a fundamental right to rear children in 
the manner they choose.174 Likewise, in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Lafleur, the Court held that freedom of personal choice in marriage 
and family matters is protected from government intrusion by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.175 The Court held that natural parents have 
a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management 
of their child in Santosky v. Kramer. 176 
2. The Fundamental Right to Procreate 
The fundamental right to procreate has been similarly protected 
by the Court. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court held that marriage and 
procreation are fundamental rights.177 In that case, the Court struck 
down a statute that required the sterilization of some felons on the 
grounds that the act involved "one of the basic civil rights of man" and 
that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race."178 
Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court held that the right 
to marital privacy is fundamental and concluded simply that the right 
of married couples to be free from government intrusion into their 
i7l See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942). 
172 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
173 [d. 
174 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
175 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). 
176 455 U.S. 748, 753 (1982). 
177 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
178 [d. at 541. 
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sexual relations and decisions to bear or beget children was a long-
standing tenet of American legal history.179 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute 
which permitted contraceptives to be distributed only to married cou-
ples because it involved "the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child. "180 And in Carey v. Population Services International, the 
Court found a fundamental right of an individual to decide whether 
or not to procreate. 181 
B. Equal Protection Claims 
In addition to the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the state from treating similar classes of people differently.182 
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal Protection of the laws. "183 The 
Court has stated, "In determining whether or not a state law violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circum-
stances behind the law, the interests which the state claims to be 
protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the 
classification."184 As a result, statutory discrimination will not be con-
sidered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the state. 185 
For example, even though a state is not required to provide wel-
fare benefits to its citizens, once it does so, it is constitutionally re-
quired to distribute it equitably.186 However, the Court has been willing 
to give considerable latitude to states in allocating their AFDC re-
sources, since "each State is free to set its own standard of need and 
to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to 
the program. "187 
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court upheld a Maryland statute 
which placed an upper limit on the amount of benefits that a family 
179 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965). 
18°405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
181 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
182 Sullivan, supra note 129, at 134. 
183U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1. 
184 Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968». 
185Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982). 
186Sullivan, supra note 129, at 139. 
187 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). 
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could receive, and held that this ceiling on benefits was not a violation 
of equal protection rights.188 The Court held that the effect of the 
statute was to diminish the lot of the entire family, rather than to totally 
deprive the youngest children of any aid. 189 The Court stated that the 
statute merely had the effect of creating an equitable balance between 
working families who do not get a raise with each additional child, and 
families on welfare.19o 
Additionally, the Court has held that the state cannot penalize 
children as a means of influencing their parents' behavior because 
such action would constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.191 Two cases illustrate the premise that 
the state cannot control the conduct of adults through their children: 
Trimble v. Gordon and Plyler v. Doe.192 In Trimble, the Court struck down 
an Illinois statute which allowed illegitimate children to inherit through 
intestate succession only from their mothers, while legitimate children 
could inherit by intestate succession from both their mother and their 
father.193 The Court held that because no child is responsible for his 
or her birth, it was unjust to penalize the child for the behavior of the 
parent. 194 This was based on the reasoning that "the parents have the 
ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate 
children can affect neither their parents conduct, nor their own status. "195 
Similarly, in Plyler, the Court struck down a Texas statute which 
sought to withhold funds from local school districts for the education 
of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States as 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.196 The Court felt that be-
cause these children could neither affect their parents, conduct nor 
their own undocumented status, it was unfair to hold them accountable 
for such status. 197 The Court stated that "imposing disabilities on the 
... child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing."198 Although the Court recognized the state's interest in 
188 397 u.S. 471 (1970). 
189 [d. at 477-78. The statute in this case only affected families with more than six people. 
190 [d. at 486. 
191 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 u.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
192 Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
193 430 U.S. at 763. 
194 [d. at 770. 
195 [d. 
196 457 U.S. at 205. 
197 [d. at 220. 
198 [d. 
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the preservation of limited resources, it found that, when taking into 
consideration the costs to the innocent children who were the victims 
of the statute the discrimination could hardly be considered rational.199 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Under the Unconstitutional Conditions Standard 
Because the family cap and Norplant-bonuses both ultimately in-
terfere with a woman's decision regarding procreation and parenting 
through monetary inducements, they are affecting fundamental rights.2°O 
Thus, strict scrutiny should be applied to the regulations to determine 
ifthey impermissibly interfere with these rights.201 These "reforms" give 
women on public assistance the government-enforced choice not to 
bear further children, or at the very least, government deterrence from 
doing SO.202 The state should be required to prove first that the law in 
question promotes a compelling governmental interest, and, second, 
that no less intrusive alternatives be available to serve the same pur-
pose.203 
There may be compelling interests behind welfare reform includ-
ing cutting costs, decreasing poverty, and encouraging responsible 
behavior.204 These are all legitimate goals of the state, and should play 
a substantial role in any welfare reform program.205 As a result, it will 
probably not be difficult for the state to meet this burden.206 
However, the state will also have to show that there were no less 
intrusive means to achieve these interests.207 This burden should be 
extremely difficult for the government to meet, considering how over-
inclusive these regulations are with respect to the actual welfare popu-
lation.208 These "reforms" are made in response to the stereotypical 
woman on welfare, not the actual population of women receiving 
199 Id. at 224, 229. 
200 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 656-57. 
201 See id. (family cap); see also Hand, supra note 132, at 722 (Norplant-bonuses). 
202 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
203Id. 
204Friedman, supra note 84, at 657; 883 F. Supp. 1004. 
205 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633. In Shapiro, the court notes that the state does 
have a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs, but notes that the saving of 
welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification. Id. 
206 See id. 
207 See, e.g., Hand, supra note 132, at 749. 
208Sullivan, supra note 129, at 142. 
1996] WELFARE "REFORMS" 241 
public assistance.209 There is not enough empirical evidence that these 
reforms will be effective, in terms of their economic or their social 
goals.2lO "A classification that is merely the result of inaccurate assump-
tions or an unproven empirical relationship is not substantially related 
to the state interest it is supposed to advance. Substantiality is required 
to insure that a classification is made with reasoned analysis, rather 
than as a result of inaccurate assumptions. "211 If all of the stereotypes 
were in fact, accurate, this might be a closer question, but because they 
are not, these reforms should be found unconstitutional under this 
standard.212 
However, a court could find that these "choices" do not interfere 
with a woman's right to reproduce, but merely represent the govern-
ment's unwillingness to subsidize it.213 This logic would include the 
viewpoint that the government is not affirmatively preventing a woman 
from having children, it is just refusing to pay for her to have more 
children.214 It follows then that a woman is still entitled to conceive and 
give birth to more children without any reduction in the benefits she 
currently receives; she just will not be given more money with the birth 
of another child.215 Similarly, under the Norplant-bonus statutes, the 
argument is that the government is not requiring any woman to receive 
the implant, it is just creating an incentive for women to use it. 216 
This reasoning would be similar to the Court's analysis in the 
abortion-funding cases. However, this should not be the appropriate 
analogy, because abortion has not always been granted the same fun-
damental status as other fundamental rights, like the rights to parent 
and procreate.217 In fact, after Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, although abortion is still recognized as a decision 
which merits constitutional protection, its regulations are no longer 
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, but rather to a lower standard 
requiring that the regulations not establish an "undue burden."218 The 
209 Friedman. supra note 84, at 659 ("Family Cap imposes the previously described inaccurate 
and negative stereotypes of welfare mothers on the seventy-five percent of the recipients who do 
not deserve it. "). 
210 Hand. supra note 132, at 723. 
211 Gerber, supra note 15, at 2169. 
212 See Friedman, supra note 84, at 657-58. 
213 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
214Friedman, supra note 84, at 651. 
215 883 F. Supp. at 1015; Friedman, supra note 84, at 651. 
216 See generally Coale, supra note 136, at 211. 
217Hand, supra note 132, at 743. 
218 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Court does not give abortion the highest level of protection and it has 
been observed that "the Court disfavors abortion rights and refuses to 
protect those rights in the same way that it protects other fundamental 
rights."219 Consequently, welfare "reform" statutes are much more simi-
lar to the fundamental rights cases than the abortion-subsidy cases, and 
should be treated that way. 220 
B. Under the Equal Protection Clause 
These statutes should also fail on equal protection grounds be-
cause they do not treat AFDC recipients equitably and they effectually 
punish the child (either the additional child born or the unborn child 
that the state is seeking to prevent) for the behavior of the parent.221 
Family caps and Norplant-bonuses are distinguishable from the benefits 
ceiling upheld in Dandridge, in that the ceiling was not intended to 
limit the reproductive rights of recipients, but rather to apportion 
limited funds among families. 222 Conversely, family caps and Norplant-
bonuses were specifically intended to affect the reproductive rights of 
these women.223 
Also, these statutes treat families of identical size differently de-
pending on whether the child was born before or after the mother 
began receiving AFDC.224 A family can enroll in AFDC with any number 
of children, and receive benefits for each and every child, yet when a 
woman who is currently enrolled in AFDC has even one more child, 
she is denied additional benefits, regardless of the circumstances.225 
This contradicts the constitutional requirement that if a state distrib-
utes welfare benefits, it must do so in an equitable manner.226 It is 
simply not equitable that one family of three would enjoy a certain 
level of benefits that another family of the same size would not, with 
the only distinguishing factor being the time that they enrolled for 
assistance.227 
Additionally, the Court has held that "obviously, no child is respon-
sible for his birth and penalizing . . . the child is an ineffectual-as 
219Hand, supra note 132, at 743. 
220 See Ballard, supra note 145, at 174; see also Sullivan, supra note 129, at 137-38. 
221 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); see also 
Sullivan, supra note 129, at 142. 
222 Sullivan, supra note 129, at 140. 
223 See id. (referring to family caps). 
224Sullivan, supra note 129, at 141. 
225 Buckley, supra note 78, at 203. 
226 Sullivan, supra note 129, at 139. 
227 See Buckley, supra note 78, at 203; see also Sullivan, supra note 129, at 141. 
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well as unjust-way of deterring the parent."228 That is precisely what 
statutes like these attempt to do--deter the parent from having more 
children, even if the brunt of the penalty falls on the child.229 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In fact, the family cap statute in New Jersey has been challenged 
on constitutional grounds.23O In addition to several administrative claims, 
both the National Organization for Women and the American Civil 
Liberties Union argued that welfare mothers have a constitutional 
right to the benefits that are cut by the family cap legislation on both 
due process and equal protection grounds.231 These groups also argue 
that the New Jersey law "violates women's constitutional rights to pri-
vately make decisions about conception and childbirth without govern-
mental intrusion."232 Lawrence Lustberg, an ACLU attorney in the case, 
states that "it is unconstitutional for a state to intrude on a woman's 
privacy in any respect .... Constitutionally, it steps over the line. "233 
However, the judge in that case decided that the family cap did 
not violate either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.234 Judge Politan held that the "family cap" did not deny 
the child benefits, but merely required them to share in the entire 
household's benefits.235 He found that the cap only placed welfare 
recipients on par with the rest of America who do not receive a raise 
with an additional child.236 The cap merely constituted the state's choice 
not to subsidize an individual's right to procreate.237 
However, Legal Services Corporation is appealing this decision, 
and has affiliates who are challenging the family caps recently enacted 
in both Arkansas and Indiana.238 Hopefully, these other courts and the 
Third Circuit will recognize the imposition these caps and reforms 
place on impoverished women. Certainly, the welfare state needs re-
forming. But reform should be about the elimination of poverty, not 
228 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 
(1972)). 
229 See id. 
230C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.NJ. 1995). 
2311d. at lOI2-15. 
232 Claiborne, supra note 6, at A7. 
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REGISTER, Feb. 13, 1995, at 1. 
234 Steven P. Bann, Welfare, NJ. LJ., July 3,1995, at 60. 
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the punishment of poor people. Meaningful welfare reform programs 
should help recipients acquire the job skills necessary to get a decent 
paying job, the life skills necessary to raise a family, and offer support 
and encouragement from the community, not hate or mistrust.239 "The 
primary goal of welfare reform must be to alleviate generational des-
titution through education and the creation of employment opportu-
nities," which must be contained in a plan which would address all of 
the reasons that people end up in poverty. 240 
In conclusion, because there is not a state interest strong enough 
to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis, these welfare "reforms" must fail. 
They intrude on rights which the Court has held to be fundamental 
and guaranteed by the Constitution, and without a compelling state 
interest, the measures are in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion. 
239 See Butts, supra note 7, at 90l. 
24°Id. at 901-02. 
